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Harmonizing Multinational Parent Company Liability 
for Foreign Subsidiary Human Rights Violations 
Vivian Grosswald Curran 
Abstract 
 
A notable development in recent years has been the ubiquity of the giant multinational 
corporation and its ability, through legal structures, to insulate itself from liability for the conduct 
of its foreign subsidiaries. In effect, multinational corporations simultaneously become legally 
invisible in their home states while potentially present through subsidiaries in innumerable other 
states. 
This Article focuses on multinational corporations whose parent companies are at home in 
a developed country while their subsidiaries operate in states in the developing world, and 
specifically where the foreign subsidiaries are alleged to have violated norms of universal human 
rights. It examines current legal theory and offers a comparative perspective on legislative and 
judicial traditions and innovations in several home states of large multinational parent companies. 
The Article includes an exposé of relevant aspects of the new Restatement (Fourth) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States, approved by a vote of the American Law 
Institute as of May 2016. The overall goal of the Article is to explore various legal methods by 
which parent-subsidiary human rights liability might be harmonized.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War and its upheavals, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights formed the basis of subsequent international human rights concepts, and may 
thus serve as a point of departure when considering victim rights. In the current era of 
transnationalization and deterritorialization, law has produced new challenges to human rights 
as circumstances have altered and destabilized existing structures. We have seen the ability of 
large corporations to operate across the globe beyond the reach of states with stricter human rights 
standards of conduct than often exist in the developing world. This is in part because universal 
human rights so far have had little success in practice in implementing claims of universality or 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
                                                 
  Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Unless otherwise noted, translations are 
mine. I thank Professor Mireille Delmas-Marty for her helpful comments on a draft of this article 
and for the opportunity to present it in an earlier form at the Collège de France. I also thank 
Professor Olivier Moréteau for inviting me to present some of the ideas expressed here at the 2016 
annual meeting of Juris Diversitas. 
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In the U.S., jurisdictional standards have tightened since the Supreme Court’s Kiobel 
and Daimler decisions. Both of those decisions undertake to further comity, however, and recent 
legal developments in several countries, particularly in the area of legislation and court decisions, 
suggest that legal harmonization might yet eclipse enough of the divide among different nations’ 
legal regimes. Such harmonization could be accomplished by bringing foreign subsidiaries’ 
violations of human rights under extraterritorial jurisdiction, or, alternatively, by reconfiguring 
legal theory such that extraterritoriality ceases to be an issue. These developments, appropriate to 
a transnationalizing world and what may evolve in its wake, suggest the potential for increasing 
international and national laws’ respect for human rights issues in a variety of ways that need 
not be mutually exclusive. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
A.  General Background 
Recent years have raised the issue of what globalization would and should 
mean for law, and in what ways the facility of encounter that is one of 
globalization’s hallmarks affects law and law’s diversity. Transnationalization has 
enabled both invisibility and ubiquity or, to borrow from the title of a 1929 essay 
by Valéry, La conquête de l’ubiquité,1 the “conquest of ubiquity.” One might describe 
this conquest of ubiquity for our purposes as the victory of economic or market 
forces. The ability of transnational corporations to become both legally ubiquitous 
and yet legally invisible has been bolstered as the world has been de-territorializing 
and national frontiers have been losing significance on numerous fronts. 
Paradoxically, human rights which have within them an inherent claim to 
universality, have not been able to accomplish this feat of the multinational 
corporation.2 International human rights have far more remained rooted in 
national legal systems, incapable of achieving the same efficiency of adaption to 
transnationalization.3 
International legal standards since the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights have formed the basis of subsequent international human rights law.4 These 
standards have not proven easy to enforce legally, but should remain the backdrop 
for analyzing present and future legal developments. That “legal liability is 
narrower than moral or ethical responsibility”5 does not imply that legal theory is 
independent of either morality or ethics. 
In the U.S., the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction over subsidiaries arose 
after the Second World War, not only as multinational corporations began to 
                                                 
1  Paul Valéry, La conquête de l’ubiquité, in II ŒUVRES COMPLETES 1283–87 (1928). 
2  Mireille Delmas-Marty, Le relatif et l’universel, in 1 LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT 54, 65 (2004). 
3  Id. 
4  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948). The 
Universal Declaration, along with the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, and the United Nations Convention against Corruption, are the basis for the U.N.’s 
Global Compact, guidelines on corporate conduct. See United Nations, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL 
COMPACT, The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, http://perma.cc/3JYR-PHTN. The Universal 
Declaration was drafted in the wake of the horrors of the Second World War. See, for example, Leila 
Nadya Sadat, The Nuremberg Trial, Seventy Years Later, Washington University in St. Louis Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 16-06-01. (June 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/9ABZ-E4MM. It had roots 
in the efforts of international legal scholars of the inter-war (post-World War I) years. For a 
beautiful account of the latter, see generally Nathaniel Berman, “But the Alternative Is Despair”: European 
Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1792 (1993). 
5  Olivier Moréteau, Individual Liability in a Vulnerable Environment: Revisiting the Ethical Foundation of Tort 
Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAAP SPIER 242 (Helmut Koziol & Ulrich Magnus eds., 2016). 
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flourish, but especially as “a flow of common information” began to enable 
strategic corporate management.6 Originally, the issue was one of two conflicting 
state interests and generally concerned an effort to control trade against an enemy 
or to further another national policy goal that involved restricting the trade of 
third countries. The issue of individual human rights victims was generally absent.7 
Today the focus has shifted. Giant multinational corporations operate 
throughout the world, often with highly complex legal structures. Skinner reports 
that in 1970, there were approximately 7,000 multinational corporations in the 
world.8 By 1990, there were 30,000. By 2000, the number had grown to 63,000; by 
2009, to about 82,000.9 There are more than 100,000 multinationals today and, 
equally importantly, those multinationals are estimated to have some 900,000 
subsidiaries or other affiliated companies.10 Joseph counts that by 2000, 
multinational corporations amounted to more than fifty of the world’s biggest 
economies.11 Avi-Yonah reports that by 2001, the value of their goods and 
services, or gross product, was estimated to equal a tenth of the entire world’s 
gross domestic product,12 and according to Guillen,13 the 500 biggest 
multinationals produce approximately a quarter of the world’s product and half of 
global trade.14 
                                                 
6  U.S. DEP’T. OF COMMERCE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: STUDIES IN U.S. FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT 3 (1972). 
7  For discussion of those statutes, see infra Sections II.B.3–4. The exceptions were U.S. policies 
concerning Uganda and Rhodesia. 
8  Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International 
Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 158, 168 (2014). 
9  Id. (citing U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Development and Production, xxi, U.N. DOC. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (July 
2009), https://perma.cc/ZHM8-5CXT). 
10  Skinner, supra note 8, at 168 (citing Damiano de Felice, Challenges and Opportunities in the Production of 
Business and Human Rights Indicators to Measure the Corporate Responsibility to Respect, 37 HUM. RTS. Q. 
(forthcoming May 2015) (manuscript at 8), https://perma.cc/GGZ5-U8KG). 
11  SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 1 (2004) (citing 
Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of Global Corporate Power, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY 
STUDIES (Dec. 4, 2000), https://perma.cc/BG6C-WXJV). 
12  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, 
Extraterritoriality and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 6 (2003) (citing U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export 
Competitiveness 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2002 (2002)). 
13  Guillen is the Director of the Wharton School’s Management and International Relations Lauder 
Institute. 
14  Mauro F. Guillen, Understanding and Managing the Multinational Firm, WHARTON, UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA 1, https://perma.cc/E4K2-83FH. 
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B.  Corporate Veil Piercing and the Human Rights Dilemma  
The autonomy of the corporate personality, the idea that the corporate veil 
is to be pierced only in the exceptional case of wrongdoing,15 is a doctrine that has 
become established throughout the world.16 This doctrine, which allows parent 
companies to maintain legal separation between themselves and their subsidiaries, 
has enabled legal invisibility. At the same time, multinationals have permeated 
many nations, since a single multinational corporation may have thousands of 
subsidiaries in hundreds of different countries. Collins has called this “the capital 
boundary problem,” and he notes that “owners of capital enjoy an unrestricted 
freedom to determine the shape and size of legal personalities which bear the 
burden of legal responsibility . . . [and] can exercise their freedom to avoid 
obligations or restrict another’s rights by adopting patterns of vertical 
disintegration for productive activities.”17 
The origins of the structure of legal separation arose in a very different era, 
however, and for purposes that are increasingly inapposite to the context of huge 
multinational corporations where subsidiaries may commit international human 
rights violations abroad. The corporate veil was meant to protect investors in a 
subsidiary who were all individuals so that those individuals would not be 
financially responsible for their company’s liabilities above the amount of their 
investments.18 Such investor liability would be a disincentive to invest, and 
consequently detrimental to the economy. Whereas today a common structure is 
for subsidiaries to be wholly owned by their parent companies, in the U.S., 
corporate entities were not permitted to own any shares in other corporations 
before the end of the nineteenth century, 1888 to be exact.19 Limited liability had 
begun to take hold in the beginning of that century.20 
In addition to the astronomical increase in the presence of multinational 
corporations in many parts of the world, past decades have seen a similarly 
impressive increase in subsidiaries that are owned entirely by other corporate 
entities, often their parent companies. Referring to U.S. multinationals in 
                                                 
15  See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH 
FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 96 (1993). 
16  See Dalia Palombo, Chandler v. Cape: An Alternative to Piercing the Corporate Veil Beyond Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Shell, 4 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 453, 453 (2015) (“[T]he concept of separate legal 
personality is established all over the world.”). 
17  Hugh Collins, Ascription of Legal Responsibility to Groups in Complex Patterns of Economic Integration, 53 
MOD. L. REV. 731, 744 (1990). 
18  See Kurt A. Strasser, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 637 (2005). 
19  Philip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of Modern Corporate Groups, 
37 CONN. L. REV. 605, 607–08 (2005). 
20  BLUMBERG, supra note 15, at 10–14. 
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particular, Blumberg reports that “most large American corporate groups function 
through wholly owned subsidiaries.”21 Yet, according to Blumberg, the transition 
allowing limited liability to extend from individual shareholders to corporate 
groups was effected without reflection in the U.S: “[N]o court ever discussed the 
problem. Limited liability of corporate groups, although one of the most 
important legal rules of modern economic society, appears to have emerged as a 
historical accident.”22 
The need for corporate legal autonomy can be questioned in today’s 
conditions: namely, where the parent company frequently exercises considerable 
dominance over the conduct of its subsidiaries, and especially to the extent that 
the dynamic of interaction between parent company and subsidiary concerns the 
good of the entire corporate enterprise, and thus is largely unrelated to its 
structural autonomy. As can be seen throughout this Article, a growing body of 
literature has been addressing this issue. 
Moreover, the plight of the human rights victim, as an illustrative instance 
of the tort victim more generally, is distinguishable from the contract creditor’s 
situation, the envisioned target of corporate limited liability. Unlike the tort victim, 
the contract creditor is, or should be, aware of the corporate structure from the 
onset of the relevant transaction.23 By contrast, the tort victim is an involuntary 
participant in the tort, with no prior opportunity to withdraw from the 
interaction.24 This distinction argues in favor of enlarging parent company liability 
specifically for tort victims.25 
The reports on corporate veil piercing in tort cases are mixed. On the one 
hand, Avi-Yonah concludes that courts often do pierce the corporate veil in tort 
                                                 
21  Id. at 141–42. 
22  Id. at 59. 
23  This is an oversimplification. There are contract creditors who typically are not part of a bargained-
for exchange, such as trade contractors and workers. For this reason, Blumberg would not make a 
distinction along the lines of the contract as opposed to tort creditor, but of the voluntary creditor, 
who bargained with the defendant, as opposed to the involuntary creditor, who had no opportunity 
or wish to enter into a transaction with the defendant. BLUMBERG, supra note 15, at 136–38. 
24  See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 
100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1601 (1991); Virginia Harper Ho, Of Enterprise Principles and Corporate Groups: 
Does Corporate Law Reach Human Rights?, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 113, 136 (2013); Janet Cooper 
Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992); 
Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2002). 
25  For authors holding this view, see supra note 24. But see Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 89, 105–12 (2013) (finding the tort/contract, involuntary/voluntary classifications largely 
unhelpful in analyzing veil piercing); Daniel R. Kahan, Note, Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts: 
A Historical Perspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1104–07 (2009) (arguing that limited liability for corporate 
torts is neither historically unjustified nor arbitrary). 
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cases because of the victim’s involuntary harm and inability to avoid risk.26 On the 
other hand, Oh cites empirical findings indicating a modern trend of diminished 
veil piercing in tort cases in the last twenty years.27 Joseph similarly draws attention 
to the distinct but germane matter that empirical studies in the U.S., England, and 
Australia reveal that courts in these countries paradoxically agree to pierce the 
corporate veil less frequently where the defendant is a corporate holding company 
than when it is an individual shareholder.28 This apparent paradox has been 
explained, however, as being due to the fact that where the defendants are 
individuals, they often run closely-held family corporations and may not observe 
legal niceties or rules in running what they perceive to be their family’s business, 
and hence their possession.29 
In the U.S., piercing the corporate veil generates more litigation than any 
other corporate law issue.30 O’Neal and Thompson correlate the frequency of 
litigation with “the broad equitable terms by which the black letter law of this 
subject is usually described,”31 whereas Oh has concluded that the equitable nature 
of the doctrine is largely overlooked.32 
Of course, just as individuals may choose not to invest in a company unless 
they are guaranteed limited liability, so too corporations might be less eager 
investors in other corporations if potential liability is augmented.33 These 
considerations must be weighed in what will often be a comparison of 
incommensurables, a balance of economic incentives against a dedication to the 
safeguarding of fundamental human rights as corporate non-state actors assume 
powers and privileges previously arrogated only to states.34 
                                                 
26  Avi-Yonah, supra note 12, at 15. 
27  Oh, supra note 25, at 127. 
28  JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 131 (citing Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical 
Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1038 (1991); C. Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English 
Courts: An Empirical Study, 13 CO. FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 15, 22 (1999); I. Ramsay & D. 
Noakes, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Australia, 19 CORP. & SEC. L.J. 250, 252 (2001)). 
29  See John S. Delikanakis, lecture for The Rossdale Group, Veil Piercing/Alter Ego Doctrine: How 
an Entity’s Veil Can Be Pierced & Similar Equitable Remedies Available to Creditors (June 22, 
2016) (author’s notes). 
30  O’Neal & Thompson, Disregarding separate personality of closely held entities, in CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
AND L.L.C.S: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.18 (3d ed. 2015). 
31  Id. 
32  Oh, supra note 25, at 89. 
33  See BLUMBERG, supra note 15, at 125. 
34  See, for example, Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 
YALE L.J. 443, 461–62 (2001) (“[C]orporations may have as much or more power . . . as 
governments.”). 
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Structural legal separation among multiple entities of a single corporation 
has been the vehicle by which multinationals incorporated in industrialized 
nations, often with exacting human rights norms, benefit from having a presence 
in the developing world, where increasingly they are being accused of grave human 
rights violations. As others have noted, such parent companies are also able to 
reap large economic benefits from their foreign subsidiaries.35 In 1990, Blumberg 
was of the view that “[t]he predominance of . . . multinational corporate 
complexes is creating irresistible pressures for the development of new legal 
concepts to impose more effective societal controls than those available under 
traditional entity law reflecting the society of centuries ago.”36 Host countries, i.e., 
those states in which the subsidiaries operate and often are incorporated, have 
welcomed much-needed capital that multinationals have invested in their 
economies in the past several decades. Some have spoken of a race to the bottom, 
a competition among numerous host nations to make themselves the most 
favorable legally and financially to investor companies.37 Some companies 
allegedly put pressure on nations to agree to conditions that will allow their 
subsidiaries the least possible foreseeable liability.38 The result has been a lessening 
of corporate regulation in developing nations.39 Additionally, human rights norms 
in those countries are often weaker than in corporate home states. Sometimes 
foreign governments have taken the initiative in committing human rights 
violations to facilitate drilling or other work with natural resources for 
multinationals in their countries.40 According to Monshipouri, Welch, and 
Kennedy, 
The MNCs’ power to control international investment . . . has had enormous 
bearing on the economies of developing countries. Faced with pressures to 
attract such investments, governments in the South have had little or no 
alternative but to be receptive to the terms of the MNCs. The lack of leverage 
with the MNCs has meant, for example, that minimum wage has been set 
unrealistically low in developing countries so as to attract foreign 
                                                 
35  See Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations 
of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769, 1777 & n. 19, 1779 (2015) (sources 
cited therein and surrounding text). 
36  Philip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 
285 (1990). 
37  See Ratner, supra note 34, at 460; Thomas Martial, L’harmonisation vers le bas de la compétence judiciaire en 
matière de responsabilité des multinationales: concordance des régimes et garantie d’impunité, LES BLOGS 
PEDAGOGIQUES DE L'UNIVERSITE PARIS OUEST (July 3, 2015), https://perma.cc/AM9F-AN38. 
38  JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 3; Skinner, supra note 35, at 1799–800 & n. 108. 
39  Skinner, supra note 35, at 1801. 
40  JOSEPH, supra note 11, at 3–4; Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing 
Medical Experimentation: Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 513, 532–33 
(2002) (discussing regulatory insufficiency in some African states). 
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investment. . . . The simultaneous surge in economic growth and inequity has 
led to serious implications for human rights in the developing world.41 
One developing country, Colombia,42 instituted a legal reform in 2008 to 
strengthen limited liability for closely held corporations and prevent any corporate 
veil piercing.43 The law was drafted by Francisco Reyes, the 2015–16 Colombian 
chairman of the U.N. Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).44 
He also drafted a proposed Model Act on Simplified Corporations for the 
Organization of American States (OAS).45 As this Article was being drafted, Reyes 
delivered the Tucker Lecture at Louisiana State University Law School, in which 
he announced that he had not been successful in his attempt at persuading 
UNCITRAL to adopt his model law, but that after passing a favorable 
resolution,46 the OAS General Assembly is set to adopt it imminently.47 
Reyes describes the Colombian law as ensuring “full-fledged limited 
liability”48 for corporations and “disregard of the legal entity theory,”49 the 
doctrine which permits courts to consider a parent and its subsidiaries as a single 
corporate entity for purposes of imposing legal liability on both parent company 
and subsidiary as a single unit.50 The “success story” that figures in the title of an 
article he wrote about the law he drafted for Colombia is a financial success for 
that nation, with millions more pesos derived in revenue since the law’s entry into 
force,51 and so much new employment created through the many new companies 
incorporated since then that “[s]tatistical analysis suggests . . . the [national] 
                                                 
41  Mahmood Monshipouri, Claude E. Welch, Jr., & Evan T. Kennedy, Multinational Corporations and the 
Ethics of Global Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 966–67 (2003). 
42  See Colombia, THE WORLD BANK, https://perma.cc/2A2J-XEA2 (characterizing Colombia as a 
developing country). 
43  L. 1258, décembre 5, 2008, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Colom.) [hereinafter Law 1258], 
https://perma.cc/ZS77-B7LN, more fully described in Francisco Reyes, The Colombian Simplified 
Corporation: An Empirical Analysis of a Success Story in Corporate Law Reform, 4 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L. 
AFF. 392 (2015). 
44  Reyes is Chairman of the U.N. Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 2015-2016. 
45  Reyes, supra note 43, at 392. 
46  Id. at 400; Francisco Reyes, Chairman, UNCITRAL, Tucker Lecture at the Louisiana State 
University Law School (May 31, 2016) (author’s Tucker Lecture notes on file with author). 
47  Reyes, Lecture, supra note 46. 
48  Reyes, supra note 43, at 393. 
49  Id. at 394. 
50  Reyes uses the term “entity theory,” in contradistinction to Blumberg’s use of “entity law” to denote 
corporate separability, and “enterprise theory” to indicate that all groups within a corporation form 
a single enterprise. See BLUMBERG, supra note 15, at 89. 
51  Reyes, supra note 43, at 394. 
Multinational Parent Company Liability Curran 
Winter 2017 413 
unemployment rate may have gone down” in the wake of the new law.52 Others 
have noted more generally the strong impact of multinationals on alleviating 
unemployment and creating wealth in host states, and, according to Monshipouri, 
Welch, and Kennedy, there is also evidence that in some countries multinationals 
have helped to increase literacy rates and decrease mortality.53 For his part, Reyes 
does not address the issue of involuntary tort law plaintiffs, of otherwise 
involuntary creditors, or of the effect of strict, full-fledged limited corporate 
liability law for corporations on the plight of human rights victims.54 
Contrary to these findings, however, recent evidence suggests that powerful, 
thriving multinationals may be detrimental to the very national economies which 
often are believed to profit from corporate success.55 Bessen has correlated the 
bargaining power multinationals exercise over both corporate home and host 
states with the exaction of favorable regulations that boost corporate valuations, 
and thus appear on the surface to reflect heightened productivity, but that reduce 
overall economic dynamism through loss of competition and a consequent loss in 
overall economic productivity.56 
 Moreover, in both the developing and the developed world, multinationals 
have become ever less subject to the jurisdiction of national courts when accused 
of violations of fundamental human rights, while human rights themselves have 
remained fully anchored in national systems.57 As a result, where alleged victims 
are unable to seek recourse in their own countries, they often attempt to do so in 
the country of the multinational’s incorporation. Such suits typically encounter an 
array of legal obstacles, including rules against extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
exhaustion of remedies, corporate veil theory, and, in common-law countries, 
forum non conveniens.58 
                                                 
52  Id.; see also id. at 403–10 (noting the huge success of the new law in terms of numbers of new 
corporations in Colombia since its enactment). 
53  Monshipouri, Welch & Kennedy, supra note 41, at 972 (citing WILLIAM H. MEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THIRD WORLD NATIONS: MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, FOREIGN AID, AND REPRESSION 105–107 (1998)). 
54  See Reyes supra, note 43. 
55  See James Bessen, Accounting for Rising Corporate Profits: Intangibles or Regulatory Rents? (Boston 
University School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 16–18, (May 2016)), 
https://perma.cc/9HKL-QFV3. 
56  See id.; see also James Bessen, Lobbyists Are Behind the Rise in Corporate Profits, HARVARD BUS. REV. (May 
26, 2016), https://perma.cc/7ETB-9T32 (finding that political activity and regulation “account for 
a surprisingly large share” of the increase in corporate profits and valuations). 
57  See MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, GLOBALISATION ECONOMIQUE ET UNIVERSALISME DES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME 10 (2004). 
58  Perhaps the most famous of the latter cases was In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster in 
Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987), concerning the disaster in Bhopal, India, 
which resulted in the deaths of some two thousand people and harm to more than 200,000. The 
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Like limited liability, these legal obstacles to tort plaintiff recovery originated 
in the pre-transnationalization era. Consequently, courts strain to apply analytical 
frameworks ill-adapted to the contemporary mobility and deterritorialization of 
capital and products. For thirty years, an exception to the clash of antiquated legal 
structures’ woeful failure to deal adequately with the human rights victims of 
foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies had been the U.S. There, foreign 
plaintiffs were able to bring such actions, whether against U.S. or foreign 
defendants, provided the human rights violations were deemed to violate 
customary international law, or, as the statute put it, the “law of nations,” under 
the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).59 The ATS grants jurisdiction to federal district 
courts over “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”60 Since Kiobel, however, those 
suits have been curtailed by the Court’s holding that the ATS lacks extraterritorial 
application due to the lack of an express grant thereof in the statutory language, 
combined with an insufficient nexus between the claims plaintiffs asserted and 
interests that “touch and concern the United States.”61 After Kiobel, the Court in 
Daimler tightened the rules for finding general personal jurisdiction against 
corporations to where a company was “at home”—namely, where it was 
incorporated or had its principal place of business, leaving open in a footnote the 
door to possible exceptions which seem improbable on the basis of the decision 
itself.62 
From the perspective of the international situation, how should the dilemma 
be resolved, especially at a time when the tendency in certain home states in which 
the parent company is incorporated has been to diminish the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction of their courts? 
                                                 
case was transferred to India by a New York federal judge pursuant to the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. 
59  Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) [hereinafter “ATS”]. For a thoughtful analysis of how 
to understand the law of nations from a comparative law perspective, see Katerina Linos, How to 
Select and Develop International Law Case Studies: Lessons from Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 
109 AM. J. INT’L. L. 475 (2015). 
60  ATS, supra note 59. 
61  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). In the language of the Court, 
the “claims” themselves must “touch and concern the United States with sufficient force” to rebut 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. Id. 
62  See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 & n. 19 (2014); Linda J. Silberman, The End of 
Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and Its Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 675, 678 (2015). 
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II.  HARMONIZATION  
A.  Introduction 
This Section addresses the sorts of harmonization that may be envisaged to 
deal with issues of multinational corporate expansion and inadequate victim 
redress for the consequences of grave human rights violations by foreign 
subsidiaries. Possibilities include treaties between and among states or action 
within states by national executives, legislators and/or courts. National steps 
might be taken in concert with counterparts in other similarly situated states,63 
easing competitive concerns that bold action may hurt any given nation’s 
companies. Alternatively, nations may act alone, either to bring themselves into 
harmony with legal developments elsewhere or to take the lead in the hope and 
expectation that others will follow. 
Already in 2001, at a time when the ATS was flourishing, Ratner underscored 
the importance of looking to an international standard that did not depend on any 
single nation.64 He argued that international law must provide a uniform, global 
norm for understanding corporate violation of human rights.65 His concern that 
there be a single, predictable law derives from the evolution of corporations into 
global entities.66 
International law so far has proven to be an elusive source of protection for 
human rights where foreign corporate subsidiaries have been accused of grave 
violations, however. While a single, universal yardstick may not be realistic, or 
even ultimately desirable,67 current legal developments in a number of home 
nations may suggest paths toward reaching standards of corporate human rights 
obligations that are mutually harmonious and compatible. 
B.  Legislation 
1. France. 
Some countries are exploring legislative avenues of potential civil recovery 
for human rights victims of foreign corporate subsidiaries in the aftermath of 
Kiobel. France has taken a first step towards a law that would allow the French 
courts to have jurisdiction for corporate violations of human rights committed by 
                                                 
63  For purposes of this Article’s scope, principally those of corporate home nations. 
64  Ratner, supra note 34, at 475–77. 
65  Id. 
66  See id. at 461–65. 
67  See Ruti Teitel, Elie Wiesel and the Limits of Witness, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (July 11, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/97X7-EW56. 
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a subsidiary of a French corporation anywhere in the world.68 It would do this by 
imputing the conduct of the subsidiary to the parent company.69 The situations in 
which this would be permissible would be limited to large corporations whose 
parent is incorporated in France with a minimum of 5,000 employees, or, if 
counting both parent and foreign subsidiaries, a minimum of 10,000 employees.70 
The parent company would have a duty of care, but the duty would be something 
more than the traditional Anglo-Saxon duty of care: the French term used is “un 
devoir de vigilance,” literally a “duty of vigilance.” This duty would extend to taking 
what the proposed law’s Article 1 describes as “reasonable measures” in order to 
“prevent the occurrence of risks of violations of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, grave bodily or environmental harms or sanitary risks.”71 This bill is 
part of a transcontinental dialogue inasmuch as in the exposé des motifs, the setting 
forth of its purposes, explicit reference was made to the ATS.72 
The French bill was inspired by the devastating collapse of a factory at Rana 
Plaza in Bangladesh in 2003.73 Some 4,000 workers were buried under the rubble, 
with over a thousand people losing their lives. It became widely publicized in 
France that French clothing brands (along with those of other countries) were 
being manufactured in the factory.74 The French companies blamed their 
suppliers, which were not liable under contemporaneous French law.75 
 After being approved in a vote by the lower house, the French bill went to 
the Senate, where it was rejected.76 The Senate debates underscored the potential 
                                                 
68  Proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre [“Law proposal (bill) concerning the duty of vigilance of parent companies and 
contractors.”]. Assemblée nationale, 14ème législature, no. 2578 (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/5AQU-QV5S. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. at art. 1(I). 
71  The relevant standards would be those obligations undertaken by the state internationally. See 
Thierry Vallat, La proposition de loi relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses 
d’ordre en seconde lecture à l’Assemblée nationale, LE BLOG DE THIERRY VALLAT, AVOCAT AU BARREAU DE 
PARIS (Mar. 22, 2016), https://perma.cc/KY3H-GNBT. 
72  See Exposé des motifs, in Proposition de loi, supra note 68, at 4. Lisbeth Enneking has credited the 
ATS with being the impetus behind a “western trend towards . . . foreign direct liability cases.” 
Lisbeth Enneking, The Future of Foreign Direct Liability? Exploring the International Relevance of the Dutch 
Shell Nigeria Case, 10 UTRECHT L. REV. 44, 44 (2014). 
73  The bill’s Exposé des motifs, supra note 68 at ¶¶ 3–4, explicitly refers to the incident. 
74  Antoine d’Abbundo, Itinéraire d’une proposition de loi, LA CROIX (June 1, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/4KZL-DW8A. 
75  The bill’s exposé des motifs also sets forth the lack of liability of the parent companies involved in the 
Bangladesh disaster. See supra note 68, Exposé des motifs, ¶ 6. 
76 See Le Sénat n'a pas adopté, en première lecture, la proposition de loi, Sénat, Session ordinaire de 
2015–2016, no. 40 (Nov. 18, 2015), https://perma.cc/P8SH-QEYH. 
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danger the law would pose to French corporate profits and, through them, to the 
national economy.77 The bill then went back to the National Assembly, where it 
was once again adopted, now in second reading, on March 23, 2016,78 after which 
it was sent back for a second time to the Senate,79 where it remains as of this 
writing. It should be noted that in France it is the National Assembly that has the 
last word, so in principle a second defeat in the Senate would not be fatal to its 
ultimate passage.80 
Of note is the resemblance between the French Senate debates and Kiobel, 
where the Court was concerned about all of the world’s victims coming to court 
in the U.S. to seek compensation under the ATS.81 For their part, some French 
Senators asked why it is always France, and only France, that must take the 
humanitarian lead to its own economic detriment, in this case by harming its own 
multinationals.82 Just as this was essentially the same attitude of some of the 
justices in Kiobel when they decided to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action,83 in the past, 
efforts in the U.K. and the E.U. to impose liability on parent companies for their 
foreign subsidiaries’ human rights violations have been stymied by similar 
concerns.84 
2. A reluctance to act unilaterally: the examples of France and the U.S. 
National economic concerns pose powerful challenges, but government 
leaders may yet be prepared to act in favor of parent company liability for 
extraterritorial subsidiary conduct where such conduct involves grave violations 
                                                 
77  See comments of Philippe Dallier and Michel Vaspart, Séance du 18 novembre 2015 (compte rendu intégral 
des débats), SENAT, https://perma.cc/UH3C-3ZYX. 
78  See Séance du mercredi 23 mars 2016, Assemblée nationale, 14ème législature, Session ordinaire de 
2015–2016, https://perma.cc/2N44-KGBA. 
79  See Proposition de loi adoptée avec modifications par l’Assemblée nationale en deuxième lecture, 
relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d'ordre, Sénat, 
Session ordinaire de 2015–2016, no. 496 (Mar. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/Q46G-K4BL. 
80  This presupposes that the President follows the general custom of allowing the National Assembly 
to be the ultimate decision maker where the two bodies, after two readings, do not come to a 
common accord on a text. See Fiche de synthèse nº32: La procédure législative, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE 
(May 16, 2014), https://perma.cc/Q6PH-FEED. Efforts by the French Senate to leave the bill 
pending until and unless the E.U. adopts a similar policy may stall it, however. 
81  Kiobel, supra note 61, at 1668 (“[T]here is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the United 
States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms.”). 
82  This is exemplified by the comments of Senator Philippe Dallier, in which the specter of a law that 
would hurt “our” French and “only . . . our” companies is raised. Séance du 18 novembre 2015, 
https://perma.cc/XKL9-XYFD. 
83  Kiobel, supra note 61, at 1677–78. 
84  See Kiobel, supra note 61, at 1669; Kiarie Mwaura, Internalization of Costs to Corporate Groups: Part-
Whole Relationships, Human Rights Norms and the Futility of the Corporate Veil, 11 J. INT’L. BUS. & L. 85, 
107 (2012). 
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of human rights. What we know is only that we are seeing a reluctance to act 
unilaterally, nationally, at the risk of harming one’s own nation economically by 
benefiting competitor nations whose multinationals would be the third-party 
beneficiaries of one’s regulations, a reluctance seen as executives, legislators and 
judges engage on a national level in a process of addressing an international, 
transnational problem caused by globalized commerce. Yet, as we have seen, 
contrary to commonly held views, Bessen’s recent evidence suggests that the 
powerful multinational in fact may be a drain on national productivity and 
economic dynamism, not a boon for them.85 
In 2010, France also enacted a law, known as “Grenelle II,” that renders 
parent companies liable for environmental harms committed by their subsidiaries, 
but only in limited circumstances.86 Those circumstances require the subsidiary to 
be in liquidation proceedings and for the parent company to be responsible for 
the subsidiary’s lack of sufficient financing to meet its legal liabilities.87 
As will be seen in the next Section, comity concerns are another 
consideration for home countries in relation to host countries.88 To the extent that 
acts at issue take place in a foreign state, that nation may object to the home 
country’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.89 
3. Comity’s growing role. 
In a perceptive 1987 article analyzing the methodology of extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, Brilmayer suggested that comity was a concern of 
Congress rather than of the judiciary, the courts’ primary focus being on 
furthering U.S. interests.90 Close to two decades later, however, after years of 
intense transnationalization, this insight may no longer be valid. Both in his recent 
book and in a 2015 talk given to France’s Supreme Court of Administrative Law, 
the Conseil d’État, Justice Breyer has signaled the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
appreciation for the importance of comity in its decision-making as one of its most 
                                                 
85  Bessen, supra note 55. 
86  Loi 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement (1), JOURNAL 
OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 13, 2010 
Article 227-II [hereinafter Grenelle II] (amending sections 512-17 of the Environmental Code). 
87  Id. 
88  This has been a repeated concern on the part of U.S. Supreme Court justices in recent years. See, for 
example, STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 123 (2015). 
89  Foreign government amicus briefs are mentioned by Justice Breyer as an important consideration 
militating against extraterritorial jurisdiction. See id. at 123, 148. 
90  Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional 
Appraisal, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 20–21 (1987). 
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significant transitions in the face of globalization.91 In The Court and the World, 
Justice Breyer traces the evolution of U.S. judicial understandings of comity, and 
sets forth some of the numerous recent Supreme Court cases that have held it to 
be an important factor in the Court’s decisions.92 As will be seen in the next 
Section, past U.S. legislation with extraterritorial effect often did raise comity 
issues in a time in which the world was less closely linked than today. 
4. Past U.S. extraterritorial legislation. 
In past legislation, the U.S. enacted numerous statutes that applied to the 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, but, in general, these were in furtherance 
of war aims, whether “hot” or “cold” in nature.93 They often provoked hostile 
responses from U.S. foreign subsidiary host countries, which felt caught in a war 
they did not care to fight on behalf of the U.S. and where a trade embargo would 
negatively affect their own economy. With the exceptions of measures aimed 
against Rhodesia and Uganda,94 however, the U.S. laws at issue were part of efforts 
to further its political goals by instituting trade restrictions and were not principally 
concerned with human rights. 
Of particular note to the present context, in the laws that gave the U.S. de 
facto jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries were provisions setting a precedent for 
considering direct liability of the parent company. For example, the Rhodesia 
regulations were framed so that officers or directors of the U.S. parent company 
would fall within their purview even if they themselves did not engage in the 
prohibited trade activity that might benefit the racially discriminatory foreign state, 
so long as they were found to have “authorize[d] or permit[ted]” their foreign 
subsidiary to do so.95 Similarly, pursuant to the trade embargo regulations 
concerning Cuba before their amendment in 1975, “an American [parent 
company] . . . actually or potentially able to control a foreign firm’s trade with Cuba 
was required to do so.”96 
                                                 
91  BREYER, supra note 88, at 97; Stephen Breyer talk at the Conseil d’État, Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the U.S., L'ordre juridique national en prise avec le droit européen et international: questions de 
souveraineté?, talk at the Conseil d’État (April 10, 2015) (notes of author). 
92  See BREYER, supra note 88, at 95–133. 
93  For a detailed discussion of these laws, see Robert B. Thompson, United States Jurisdiction Over Foreign 
Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 L. & POL. INT’L BUS. 319 (1983). 
94  Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 530.403–10 (1970); laws aiming to deprive Idi 
Amin’s Uganda of U.S. coffee market, 22 U.S.C. § 286e–7(Supp. V 1981) (amendment to Bretton-
Woods). 
95  Rhodesian Sanctions Regulations, supra note 93. 
96  Thompson, supra note 93, at 331 & n.44 (emphasis added) (citing Letter from Stanley Sommerfield, 
former Director of Office of Foreign Affairs Control, to Professor Robert Thompson, Associate 
Professor of Law at Washington University (Mar. 28, 1983)). 
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The “actual or potential control” standard also had been part of much earlier 
extraterritorial laws. The 1941 amendments to the Trading with the Enemy Act 
extended to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, 97 especially in light of the 
definition given in a Treasury Circular, creating responsibility where parent 
companies had either actual or potential control.98 Moreover, some definitions 
equated ownership with control; in the regulations forbidding trade with China 
that arose from the Korean War, ownership figured as a sufficient criterion for 
parent company responsibility.99 More generally, ownership is interpreted as 
requiring a majority or more of the shares of a company,100 and, according to the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, ownership usually implies control.101 
5. The modern era. 
Numerous U.S. statutes specify extraterritorial application, or have been 
interpreted as doing so.102 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)103 
is an established U.S. statute with extraterritorial application that has raised 
concerns similar to those raised with respect to the ATS and the proposed French 
statute discussed earlier: namely, that the law renders national companies less 
competitive in a global business environment.104 The statute imposes penalties, 
among others, on U.S. multinational companies that bribe foreign officials.105  
So long as the legislative language is deemed to be express, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly stated that, since the modern era of EEOC v. Aramco, 
extraterritorial application is permissible. 106 The modern line of cases establishes 
a presumption against extraterritoriality. In Kiobel, relying on a line of precedents, 
the Supreme Court stated that “to rebut the presumption, the ATS would need to 
evince a ‘clear indication of extraterritoriality.’ It does not. To begin, nothing in 
the text of the statute suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized 
                                                 
97  Trading with the Enemy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 95a (2012), 50 U.S.C. app’x. §§ 1–39 (1976 & Supp. V 
1982). 
98  U.S. Treasury Public Circular No. 18 of March 30, 1942, 7 Fed. Reg. 2503 (April 1, 1942). 
99  31 C.F.R. § 500.329(a) (1982). 
100  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 414, cmt. e at 272 (Am. Law Inst. 1987). 
101  Id. 
102  Foremost among them is the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012), although its interpretation has 
been subject to changing judicial standards. 
103  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd–1 (2012) [hereinafter FCPA]. 
104  See Avi-Yonah, supra note 12, at 18–19. 
105  See FCPA, supra note 103. 
106  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 
U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). For the frequent absence of legislative directive as to extraterritorial 
applicability of statutes and the judicial presumption that lack of guidance should be equated with 
lack of extraterritoriality, see Brilmayer, supra note 90, at 15 & n. 23 and sources cited therein. 
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under it to have extraterritorial reach.”107 Thus, unless Congress uses express 
language permitting extraterritorial jurisdiction, a statute will be deemed to 
prohibit it. 
6. The possibility of custom-made laws. 
A headline-maker in the U.S. came from a law Congress passed to facilitate 
the path for Iranian terrorism victims in executing U.S. court judgments.108 The 
law in question referred explicitly to the docket number of the Iranian terrorism 
case,109 the case being, it should be noted, actually a consolidation of sixteen 
cases.110 The Supreme Court decided a challenge to the constitutionality of the 
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act in Bank Markazi.111 It upheld 
the law, noting that statutes aimed at specific cases are not new, and that they need 
not for that reason be invalid.112 A dissenting opinion signed by the unlikely 
combination of Justices Roberts and Sotomayor disagreed, concluding that the 
majority was permitting a violation of the separation of powers inasmuch as 
Congress had interfered with the powers of the judicial branch.113 By affirming the 
law’s validity, however, the majority opinion suggests the vast powers of Congress 
to fashion laws to ensure victim compensation in a highly tailor-made fashion. 
7. Switzerland, Canada, and Sweden. 
In addition to France and the U.S., several developed countries are also 
innovating in this area. In Switzerland, a popular initiative proposes a 
constitutional amendment that, if passed, would impose human rights duties on 
Swiss corporations as well as their foreign subsidiaries.114 In Canada, the Foreign 
Investment Review Act115 has been applied to deal with multinational corporations 
                                                 
107  Kiobel, supra note 61, at 1665 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264 
(2010)). 
108  Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012). 
109  See id. at § 8772(b) (referring to “the financial assets that are identified in and the subject of 
proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson 
et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG)”). 
110  Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1319–20 (2016). 
111  Id. at 1329. 
112  Id. at 1317, 1327 (“Even laws that impose a duty or liability upon a single individual or firm are not 
on that account invalid.”) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 239 & n. 9 (1995)). 
113  Id. at 1329. 
114  See Anina Dalbert, Corporate Accountability in Supply Chains of Swiss Multinational Enterprises: An 
Impossible Case?, 25–30 (2015) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, The Graduate Institute Geneva, 
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), https://perma.cc/7F8A-YWNM. 
115  Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973–74 Can. Stat., c 46, amended by 1976–77 c 52. This statute 
was the predecessor to the Investment Canada Act, currently in force, R.S.C. 1985 Supp. 1, c 28 
(1988). 
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as if parent and subsidiary were one business enterprise.116 Sweden also has 
exercised jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries through the extraterritorial reach 
of a statute targeting South Africa and Namibia, but provided that its law would 
not conflict with those of the subsidiary’s home state.117 
8. Criminal Law. 
Fourçans has called attention to a trend of incorporating international 
human rights standards into domestic criminal law.118 In 2010, as a signatory to 
the Rome Statute,119 France incorporated all crimes subject to the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction into its national law.120 While both common law and 
civil law legal orders delineate between criminal and civil law, many of the 
functions of criminal law cases in civilian jurisdictions are filled by tort law in 
common law systems, a reason to urge universal jurisdiction standards in common 
law countries for tort cases where the underlying acts are grave violations of 
human rights.121 Interestingly, as will be seen in Section D, below, at least in some 
measure due to the transnationalization of law in a world of enhanced judicial 
communication,122 numerous interesting developments have been taking place in 
recent years in civil law systems in tort recovery that are of consequence to foreign 
subsidiary human rights violations. 
                                                 
116  See Reporters’ Note 2 in RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, at 274–76. Due to U.S. subsidiaries’ 
being within the extraterritorial reach of this statute, the U.S. protested. See id. 
117  See id. at 276 (citing LAG (1985:98) OM FÖRBUD MOT INVESTERINGAR I SYDAFRIKA [Act (1985:98) 
banning investments in South Africa] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1985:98) (repealed Dec. 1, 
1993) (Swed.), https://perma.cc/9C8T-N9U4. 
118  See Claire Fourçans, Le réinvestissement de l’État dans la répression des crimes internationaux, in MUTATIONS 
DE L’ÉTAT ET PROTECTIONS DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 87 (Danièle Lochak ed., 2006). 
119  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998, UN Doc 
A/CONF 183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002). 
120  Loi 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 portant adaptation du droit pénal à l’institution de la Cour pénale 
internationale, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE] (Aug. 10, 2010.). 
121  See generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes Against 
Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 363 (2008); Brief of Amici Curiae of Comparative 
Law Scholars and French Supreme Court Justice in Support of Petitioners on the Issue of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-
1491), 2012 WL 2165341. 
122  The enhanced communication affecting civilian legal systems is also that of lawyers who for some 
time have been urging common-law based arguments in Continental European systems. See Curran, 
supra note 121, at 387, 390–97. 
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C. Treaties 
Treaties dealing with parent company liability and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
would allow for a similar response across corporate home states, if not beyond. 
Indeed, they could allay fears on the part of any single nation about harming its 
own corporations by reducing competition among treaty signatories to offer 
friendlier judicial soil to multinationals. Avi-Yonah points to the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) achievement of 1997, in the 
aftermath of the FCPA, when U.S. multinationals were able to persuade five other 
states to adopt the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions as part of the OECD.123 Other successful 
treaties, albeit bilateral rather than multilateral, have been in the area of antitrust 
between the U.S. and Australia, and the U.S. and Germany.124 
Treaties concerning corporate responsibility for human rights violations 
have so far proven elusive. They remain at the soft-law level, with the European 
Commission declaring that Member States’ corporations must start developing 
standards for the protection of society,125 and the U.N. developing a Global 
Compact to invite corporate respect for human rights126 and Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights.127 In 2014, the U.N. Human Rights Council 
passed a resolution to develop a binding treaty on multinational corporate human 
rights obligations, a project opposed by both the E.U. and the U.S.128 In the 
absence of a treaty, it has been suggested that states engage in notification and 
consultation where they intend to extend their jurisdiction over a subsidiary 
                                                 
123  Avi-Yonah, supra note 12, at 19 & n. 51 (citing Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1997)). 
124  Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, 34.1 U.S.T. 388 (1982); Agreement Between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 27.2 U.S.T.I.A. 
1956 (1976). 
125  See Frédérique Berrod & Antoine Ullestad, Le droit de l’Union européenne et la notion d’entreprise: donner 
un sens juridique à l’exercice de l’activité économique, in RESPONSABILITE SOCIALE DES ENTREPRISES 135, 
146 (Kathia Martin-Chenut & René de Quenaudon eds., 2016). 
126  The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL, http://perma.cc/3JYR-
PHTN. 
127  Human Rights Council, Rep. of John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (March 21, 2011). 
128  Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). For an in-depth 
analysis of the Resolution, see Si Chen, Towards a Business and Human Rights Treaty (June 20, 
2015) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Oslo Faculty of Law), https://perma.cc/H3BD-
V5W3. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 424 Vol. 17 No. 2 
incorporated in the other’s territory.129 In the E.U., directives affecting all Member 
States may be seen as hybrids between treaties and simple legislation, since they 
are both international and intra-European. The 1983 Seventh Council Directive 
requires parent companies to file financial information about their foreign 
subsidiaries, whether or not those subsidiaries are located within the E.U.130  
In contrast to some of the soft law developments we have mentioned at the 
international level, the next section will illustrate that no political or government 
entity has seen as much activity as the judiciary in adapting the law to the new 
challenges multinationals pose to fundamental human rights. 
D.  Judicial Developments  
This Section will explore judicial developments in a number of home state 
nations. Judicial dialogue is abundant among all of them, and within the E.U.’s 
Member States all cases are subject to review by the same courts—the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). 
1. Introduction. 
a) Situating the U.S. 
Judicial harmonization to address parent company liability for foreign 
subsidiaries’ grave violations of human rights would be a harmonization either in 
a different direction from the U.S.’s recent re-territorialization of the principle of 
jurisdiction,131 or, alternatively, one that did not apply existing standards of 
extraterritoriality to universal human rights violations. A concurrence in Kiobel, for 
instance, “found the presumption against extraterritorial application to be out of 
place when it came to the ATS,”132 whereas the Court’s opinion essentially 
changed the terrain of ATS analysis from one of universal human rights to the 
extraterritoriality norms of commercial law by aligning the case with others from 
a commercial context that had nothing to do with issues of universal human rights, 
as illustrated by its heavy reliance on Morrison, a securities regulation case.133 In 
                                                 
129  Note, Extraterritorial Subsidiary Jurisdiction, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 93 (1987). 
130  Council Directive 83/349, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1. 
131  Vivian Grosswald Curran, La jurisprudence récente de la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis en matière 
d’extraterritorialité et autres questions d’importance internationale, 43 RECUEIL DALLOZ 2473 (Dec. 11, 
2014). 
132  BREYER, supra note 88, at 159. 
133  See Kiobel, supra note 61, at 1664, 1665, 1666. Kiobel also cites to Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 
550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007), Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666, as well as to other cases unrelated to human 
rights issues. The antitrust Empagran case, F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 
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2014, it bears noting, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked European law where it 
denied jurisdiction in Daimler, suggesting it was interested in harmonizing U.S. and 
European law.134 
Like the U.S. Supreme Court in Kiobel and Daimler, courts dealing with 
multinational parent company liability for foreign subsidiaries’ human rights 
violations find that their cases often involve an intersection of laws concerning 
procedure and jurisdiction, such as extraterritoriality, with commercial and 
corporation law. As we have seen, international legal doctrines such as comity also 
figure increasingly in decision making. 
b) Corporation law 
(1) Single business enterprise liability 
Within corporation law, the “single business enterprise liability” doctrine has 
not received much traction in courts to date. This doctrine, however, has historical 
roots, and might be reinvigorated today, as lawyers in favor of parent company 
liability might argue it increasingly in transnational cases. Under single business 
enterprise liability, all entities that share the same commercial objective within a 
corporation of a complex structure are liable as if they constitute a single 
corporation.135 The principle that a parent company and its subsidiaries always 
have the same goals and interests is already recognized by the Supreme Court in 
antitrust law: 
[T]here can be little doubt that the operations of a corporate enterprise 
organized into divisions must be judged as the conduct of a single actor. The 
existence of an unincorporated division reflects no more than a firm's 
decision to adopt an organizational division of labor. A division within a 
corporate structure pursues the common interests of the whole rather than 
interests separate from those of the corporation itself; a business enterprise 
establishes divisions to further its own interests in the most efficient 
manner.136 
Under the appellation of the “group of companies” doctrine, the single 
business enterprise theory has been making headway in international arbitration, 
and may be particularly apposite to issues of parent company liability for 
corporations’ foreign subsidiaries’ human rights violations.137 As will be seen in 
                                                 
U.S. 155 (2004), figures in Justices Thomas and Alito’s concurring opinion. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 
1671. 
134  Daimler, supra note 62, at 763. 
135  John H. Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An Empirical Study of Piercing the Corporate Veil 
in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091, 1099 (2009). 
136  Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 770 (1984). For additional areas of 
law that adopt similar reasoning, see Strasser, supra note 18, at 662, 664. 
137  See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE 101 (2016), citing in 
particular Interim Award in ICC Case No. 4131. 
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Section E, below, European competition law applies single business enterprise 
liability. 
(2) Agency 
In the U.S., agency law, or quasi-agency law, already applies to commercial 
law as a variant of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.138 In general, it 
requires the court to find that the parent company controls the subsidiary and that 
the two are interdependent and integrated.139 In Daimler, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected finding a connection under agency law between the subsidiary 
incorporated in California and the parent company, Daimler, which was a German 
corporation. 140 The Daimler Court held that the lower court lacked jurisdiction 
over the parent company.141 In the U.S., with its common-law methodology, the 
specifics of each case are highly important, leaving a great deal of discretion to the 
trial court as finder of fact. This does not facilitate the predictive value of how 
effective agency or corporate veil piercing theories may be for a given case, but it 
does leave the door open to creative and evolving solutions on a case-by-case 
basis. 
Normally, veil piercing in the U.S. requires the court to find misconduct, 
often of a fraudulent nature.142 In the situation we are discussing, in which a 
foreign subsidiary violates fundamental human rights, one can invoke parent 
company manipulation, not in the traditional sense of showing that the parent 
company stripped a subsidiary of funds, but, if the case’s facts support the 
argument, by claiming that the parent company placed the subsidiary in a location 
where the latter would not have to face liability for gross human rights abuses. 
Case law in any event tends to allow veil piercing only for the specific purposes 
having to do with the subject matter of the lawsuit at hand.143 Thus, a doctrine 
relating to the grave human rights violations of foreign subsidiaries may be quite 
limited in subject matter, relieving courts of needing to do anything more than 
delineate exceptions. 
As the next Section illustrates, we are seeing such a limited exception being 
carved out in the area of foreign sovereign immunity for expropriations made by 
                                                 
138  See PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: SUBSTANTIVE LAW § 6.06.2, at 128 
(1987) (“The term ‘agent’ or ‘agency’ are most frequently being employed by the courts loosely as 
one of the numerous conclusory metaphors to ‘pierce the corporate veil jurisprudence.’”) 
139  See PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURE §§ 1.02.2, 4.02, 4.04.1 
(1983); PHILIP I. BLUMBERG, SUBSTANTIVE COMMON LAW §§ 6.06, 14.03.3 (1987). 
140  134 S. Ct. 758–60. 
141  Id. 
142  BLUMBERG, supra note 15, at 96. 
143  Id. 
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foreign sovereign states in the context of genocide, and perhaps other grave 
violations of human rights. 
2. The new Restatement (Fourth) of United States Foreign Relations. 
In May 2016, the American Law Institute membership voted to approve 
parts of the new Restatement (Fourth) of the United States Principles of Foreign Relations 
with respect to the immunity of foreign states from jurisdiction.144 The new text 
reflects recent evolutions in court decisions that have widened exceptions to 
foreign state immunity where expropriations by foreign countries have been made 
as part of genocide.145 This development reflects an introduction into case law, 
now reflected in the new Restatement, of a new jurisdictional category for human 
rights violations. 
The overall purpose of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)146 is to 
set forth the situations in which the U.S. immunizes foreign states from being 
sued in its courts, but the statute contains an exception for cases “in which 
property taken in violation of international law are in issue.” 147 This jurisdictional 
opening does not apply, however, where a state has committed the alleged 
expropriation against its own nationals, a rule known as the “domestic takings 
exception.”148 Interestingly, in recent cases in which a new human rights category 
for genocide was created, the courts might have reached the same ultimate 
decision to allow the suits to proceed under pre-existing case law by holding that 
the plaintiffs had not been deemed citizens or full-fledged citizens by their own 
governments at the time of the wrongful taking and that, therefore, the domestic 
takings exception was inapplicable.149 
                                                 
144  See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE UNITED STATES PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (AM. L. 
INST. Tentative Draft No. 2., 2016). As of the writing of this Article, the text voted by the ALI 
membership in May, 2016 theoretically is subject to some possible continued editorial change by 
the Reporters, but the author has been told by one of its drafters that no further changes will be 
made (email exchange between author and Reporter Prof. David Stewart, August 22, 2016), nor did 
comments at the May 2016 ALI meeting suggest membership criticism of it. (Author’s notes). 
145  Id. 
146  28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, et seq. 
147  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). 
148  United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
149  See, for example, de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, 808 F. Supp. 2d 113, 130 (D.D.C., 2011), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 714 F.3d 591 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 461 
F. Supp. 2d 1157 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 580 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 
2009), reh. en banc, 616 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied sub nom., Kingdom of Spain v. Estate of 
Cassirer, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 428 Vol. 17 No. 2 
a) Pre-existing domestic takings case law. 
In de Csepel v. Republic of Hungary, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court had 
rejected defendant Hungary’s argument that expropriations of Jewish property in 
the 1940s constituted a domestic taking and therefore did not rise to FSIA Section 
1605(a)(3)’s international law violation requirement.150 The court had reasoned 
that, since the Hungarian government no longer treated Jews as citizens at the 
time of the expropriation, the taking could not be deemed “domestic” in nature.151 
Therefore, the domestic takings exception was inapplicable.152 Similarly, in Cassirer 
v. Kingdom v. Spain,153 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California 
had reasoned that a German-Jewish victim’s heir could sue under the Section 
1605(a)(3) of the FSIA over a valuable painting that had been extorted from his 
grandmother as the price of her exit visa from Nazi Germany. It held that the suit 
did not come within the domestic takings exception because the Nazi government 
had not considered Jews to be citizens of Germany when the painting was 
extorted.154 In a 1951 case cited by later FSIA domestic taking courts, Nagano v. 
McGrath, the Seventh Circuit had defined citizenship as follows: “[O]ur concept 
of a citizen is one who has the right to exercise all the political and civil privileges 
extended by his government.”155  
In more recent cases, however, instead of applying the domestic takings rule 
in the manner of established case law, courts have created a novel exception to 
the FSIA, nowhere to be found in the statute’s language, that is based on the 
context of genocide and perhaps other grave violations of human rights.156 
According to the new Restatement,  
[b]y eliminating the “domestic takings” rule and permitting claims to go 
forward on the basis of allegations that the takings occurred in the context of 
egregious violations of international law, this line of decisions appears to 
expand the scope of § 1605(a)(3) significantly, potentially opening courts in 
the U.S. to a wide range of property-related claims arising out of foreign 
internal (as well as international) conflicts characterized by widespread human 
rights violations.157 
                                                 
150  808 F. Supp. 2d 113. 
151 Id. at 130. 
152  Id. 
153  461 F. Supp. 2d 1157. 
154  Id. at 1165–66. 
155  187 F.2d 759, 768 (7th Cir. 1951). 
156  Simon et al. v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti 
Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 858 
(7th Cir. 2015) (same case essentially reheard by Seventh Circuit). 
157  RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), supra note 144, at § 455, Reporters’ Note 4. 
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b) The new FSIA cases that created the human rights exception. 
Like de Csepel, discussed above, Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank158 was a FSIA 
case concerning property takings by Hungarian national banks and the national 
railway from members of Hungary’s Jewish population during the 1940s. The 
defendants raised the domestic takings rule in a motion to dismiss.159 Here, 
however, the Seventh Circuit did not reason that the domestic takings exception 
was inapplicable due to the state’s not regarding the victims as full-fledged 
Hungarian citizens at the time of the taking; rather, the Abelesz court found that 
“the relationship between genocide and expropriation in the Hungarian Holocaust 
takes these cases outside the domestic takings rule and its foundations.”160 It 
explained the underpinning of its conclusion as follows: 
Expropriating property from the targets of genocide has the ghoulishly 
efficient result of both paying for the costs associated with a systematic 
attempt to murder an entire people and leaving destitute any who manage to 
survive. The expropriations alleged by plaintiffs in these cases—the freezing 
of bank accounts, the straw-man control of corporations, the looting of safe 
deposit boxes and suitcases brought by Jews to the train stations, and even 
charging third-class train fares to victims being sent to death camps—should 
be viewed, at least on the pleadings, as an integral part of the genocidal plan 
to depopulate Hungary of its Jews. The expropriations thus effectuated 
genocide in two ways. They funded the transport and murder of Hungarian 
Jews, and they impoverished those who survived, depriving them of the 
financial means to reconstitute their lives and former communities. All U.S. 
courts to consider the issue recognize genocide as a violation of customary 
international law.161 
The following year, a California district court went a step further by ruling 
that FSIA jurisdiction was proper even though, after examining the laws of 
citizenship in the Ottoman Empire at the time of the Armenian genocide, it 
determined that, unlike the situation of Jews in Nazi Germany, Armenians had 
been considered full-fledged citizens by their government.162 Nevertheless, it held 
that the FSIA did not protect the Republic of Turkey from suits in the U.S. under 
both the reasoning of Abelesz, noted above,163 and the ATS standards the U.S. 
                                                 
158  692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2012) aff’d, Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 858 (7th Cir. 
2015) (same case essentially reheard by Seventh Circuit). 
159  Id. 
160  692 F.3d at 675. 
161  Id. (emphasis added); aff’d, Fischer v. Magyar Allamvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847, 858 (7th Cir. 2015) 
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162  Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1101–1102 (C.D. Cal. 2013). 
163  Id. 
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Supreme Court had set forth in Sosa,164 namely, that customary international laws 
must be “specific, universal, and obligatory.”165 
Finally, in Simon v. Republic of Hungary,166 a case also involving war-time 
expropriations of Hungary’s Jewish population, the D.C. Circuit seemed to take 
yet an additional step beyond both Abelesz and Davoyan, by equating Hungary’s 
expropriation of its Jewish population with genocide: “In our view, the alleged 
takings did more than effectuate genocide or serve as a means of carrying out 
genocide. Rather, we see the expropriations as themselves genocide. It follows 
necessarily that the takings were ‘in violation of international law.’”167 
Thus, the FSIA expropriations exception for takings in violation of 
international law has become a form of universal jurisdiction for the gravest 
human rights violations under the FSIA. Such judicial extensions of jurisdiction 
in civil suits can be a model and compelling argument for the significance of 
fundamental human rights violations as grounds for jurisdiction in future cases 
over parent companies in both property and torts cases. In the words of the 
Restatement (Fourth), this new case law may open “courts in the U.S. to a wide range 
of property-related claims arising out of foreign internal conflicts characterized by 
human rights violations.”168 Where they do so for property-related claims outside 
of the FSIA, they should do so a fortiori for tort claims, whose links to customary 
international law violations are closer than in expropriation cases. 
As the next section discusses, the new Restatement also addresses the 
exhaustion of local remedies. Where it previously was silent, and some courts 
misconstrued international law norms, the new Restatement clarifies the issue of 
exhausting local remedies. 
c) Under international law, the exhaustion of local remedies arises in cases under 
the jurisdiction of international tribunals, not of national courts.  
The issue of exhausting local remedies arises frequently in cases involving 
parent companies and their subsidiaries from different states, since, for reasons 
discussed earlier, the victim frequently is not suing in the state in which the alleged 
human rights violations took place, but rather the state in which the parent 
company is at home. The exhaustion of local remedies requirement originated in 
the system of diplomatic protection, and was based on the idea that when an 
                                                 
164  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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individual was harmed, his or her state was offended and would take protective 
legal action.169 
International law has an exhaustion requirement only with respect to cases 
before an international tribunal. This requirement exists so that the tribunal does 
not appear to be usurping the role of national courts: “A claim will not be 
admissible on an international plane unless the individual alien or corporation 
concerned has exhausted the legal remedies available to him in the state which is 
alleged to be the author of injury.”170 Although the Restatement (Third) did not 
explicitly limit the exhaustion requirement to cases before international tribunals, 
its commentary indicated that this was the nature of exhaustion. It characterized 
the rule as “‘generally [having] been observed in cases in which a State has adopted 
the cause of its national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in 
another State in violation of international law;’” and that exhaustion is required in 
such situations “‘[b]efore resort may be had to an international court.’”171  
The exhaustion requirement also serves the important additional goal of 
securing the adherence of Member States to the international court system by 
ensuring the ongoing subsidiarity of the international court to the national 
courts.172 There has been a divergence of interpretations of this international law 
requirement among courts in the U. S. which interpreted the FSIA. The new 
Restatement takes a clearer stand than the last one concerning the exhaustion rule: 
“[T]he rule . . . applies by its terms to “international,” not domestic, proceedings. 
Accordingly, the interpretation of the statute that does not require exhaustion 
appears to be the proper one.”173 
The Restatement’s language refers to the interpretation of the FSIA, a specific 
statute, and would not restrict a domestic law that Congress had enacted from 
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies. On the other hand, the utility of 
exhaustion requirements where international human rights violations are alleged 
is being increasingly called into question, especially since such cases may involve 
plaintiffs who are victimized in their home states. As Judge Trindade has put it, 
the rule of exhausting local remedies 
                                                 
169  See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS ¶ 71 (1758). 
170  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed., 2008). 
171  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, at § 713, Reporters’ Note 5 (quoting Interhandel 
(Switzerland v. United States of America), I.C.J. Rep. [1959] ICJ 6, 26–27 (emphasis added)). 
172  See A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL 
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ITS RATIONALE IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 9–10 (1983); Paula Rivka Schochet, A New Role for an Old Rule: Local Remedies 
and Expanding Human Rights Jurisdiction Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 223, 227, 235 (1987). 
173  RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 100, at § 455, Reporters’ Note 9. 
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enjoyed, in classical diplomatic protection and State responsibility for injuries 
to aliens, a “negative” or preventive character, with emphasis on the character 
of exhaustion prior to international interposition on a discretionary State-to-
State basis. This approach to the rule is hardly adequate for human rights 
protection . . . [i]n a system of protection fundamentally . . . concerned with 
the rights of individual human beings rather than of States.174 
According to D’Ascoli and Scherr, “in order to be properly understood, the 
rule of exhaustion of local remedies should be regarded differently in the two 
diverse contexts of diplomatic and human rights protection. It is not convincing 
to apply the classic rule in its original form and meaning to the field of human 
rights.”175 While the applicability of exhaustion requirements to human rights 
cases is an evolving issue, it is well established and uncontroversial that the 
exhaustion of local remedies will not be required if it has been determined that 
they are unavailable, fruitless, or meaningless.176 
3. A last word about the judiciary and the U.S. presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
The extraterritorial reach of U.S. law, although always controversial in terms 
of comity concerns, as recently expressed by Supreme Court justices,177 is not 
inherently problematic. As we have seen, numerous U.S. statutes over time have 
specified an extraterritorial application, and, so long as the legislative language is 
express, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that extraterritorial application 
is permissible.178 The modern line of cases establishes a presumption against 
extraterritoriality which, as applied in Kiobel, reversed a thirty-year tradition of 
                                                 
174  AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 99 
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175  Silvia D’Ascoli & Kathrin Maria Scherr, The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the International 
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176  See International Law Commission: Draft Articles Adopted in 2006, in BROWNLIE, supra note 170, at 501; 
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U.S. court decision-making so as to respect other countries’ laws and sovereignty. See also The 
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(1804), setting forth the principle that U.S. statutes should be interpreted whenever possible to 
comport with international law. 
178  EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co, 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Morrison v. Nat’l Australian Bank, Ltd., 561 
U.S. 247 (2010); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2013); Kiobel, supra note 
61, at 1659. 
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allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction under the ATS.179 The Supreme Court stated 
in that case that its hands were tied because the legislature had not expressly 
conferred extraterritorial jurisdiction on the statute: “nothing in the text of the 
statute suggests that Congress intended causes of action recognized under it to 
have extraterritorial reach.”180 On the other hand, to the extent that universal 
human rights are accorded a status of universality, to recognize, vindicate, and 
enforce such rights arguably lies outside of the realm of extraterritoriality.181 
Ratner correctly points out a general reluctance on the part of states to base 
jurisdiction on universal jurisdiction, however.182 In my view, the Kiobel decision, 
although reasoned on the terrain of statutory interpretation, is interpretable as an 
instantiation of this reluctance. Moreover, as Brilmayer noted, 
When a [U.S.] court decides whether a statute should apply to a situation 
which the statute does not address, it inescapably relies upon its own 
normative views. If one result seems more desirable than another, and the 
legislature has not expressed a preference, then it seems only reasonable to 
interpret the statute in accordance with the court’s own view of what is 
desirable and just. After all, it is sensible to think that the legislature would 
have wanted this “better” result. The result is a peculiar combination of 
normative reasoning and deference to Congress, a normative view which is 
attributed to Congress even though it does not really express an actual 
congressional choice. This process is clearly at work in the extraterritorial 
application of American law. Typically, a statute is silent as to its international 
scope. It seems sensible to interpret the statute in line with the court’s own 
view of how far statutes ought to reach. . . . The court decides according to 
its own ideas of justice, usually shaped by principles and traditions of 
international law, but it need not assume explicit responsibility for having 
done so. The result is then couched in the language of deference to 
Congress.183 
What about the distinction between physical persons and corporations, the 
issue originally brought to the Supreme Court in Kiobel in terms of capacity for 
liability under the ATS, but never addressed? It has been suggested that, as 
corporate rights have been constitutionalized,184 so too should unitary corporate 
responsibilities, including those of parent companies and subsidiaries in protecting 
human rights, or at the least by means of legislative action. As Mwaura has pointed 
out, “[w]hilst states that have reformed their constitutions in order to extend 
human rights norms to corporations are to be commended for taking this 
                                                 
179  The first case was Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
180  133 S. Ct. at 1665. 
181  Ratner, supra note 34, at 535–36. 
182  Id. 
183  Brilmayer, supra note 90, at 17. 
184  In the U.S., see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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approach, they need to go a step further by utilizing enterprise principles to extend 
tortious and human rights liability to the entire network of corporate groups, 
which were not the intended beneficiaries of the privileges of limited liability when 
they were first devised.” 185 Ratner, for his part, takes pains to emphasize the 
differences between corporations and individuals “in terms of their access to 
resources, their ability to harm human dignity, and ability to avoid the control of 
the state.”186 For this reason, he believes that “the primary [international] rules 
binding on individuals are so narrow as to make transferring them to corporations 
insufficient.”187 
While the U.S. has tended in recent years to utilize a single lens of 
extraterritoriality that has its roots in antitrust and commercial law, other countries 
have been developing extraterritorial civil liability that ultimately may influence 
the U.S. Supreme Court when it considers comity and pursues its goal of 
harmonizing law. 
4. Home country case law developments outside of the U.S. 
a) France 
France’s foray into expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction has not just been by 
means of the legislative proposal discussed earlier. One commentator has referred 
to “normative shifts” (“mutations normatives”) that include court decisions occurring 
in French society with respect to rendering parent companies liable for subsidiary 
breaches of fundamental rights.188 
In 2011, France created a section of the Paris criminal court to specialize in 
handling crimes against humanity.189 In 2009, a French court exercised 
extraterritorial jurisdiction where the Palestine Liberation Organization and 
France-Palestine Solidarité sued two French companies for building a light railway 
                                                 
185  Mwaura, supra note 84, at 109. Mwaura notes that a number of African nations, including Kenya, 
Malawi, Gambia, Ghana and South Africa in fact have imposed human rights norms on companies. 
Id. at 85. For a more general theoretical framework for the constitutionalization of human rights 
vis-à-vis multinational corporations, see Angelo Golio, Jr. Enforcing Human Rights Through 
Constitutional Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Pacific Rim v El Salvador (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
186  Ratner, supra note 34, at 494. 
187  Id. (emphasis added). 
188  Yann Queinnec, Émergence du devoir de vigilance raisonnable ou l’impératif de cohérence des dispositifs de 
gouvernance ESG, 20 REVUE INT. DE LA COMPLIANCE ET DE L’ETHIQUE DES AFFAIRES 4, 4 (2016). 
189  Pôle judiciaire spécialisé compétent pour les crimes contre l’humanité, Art. 22, loi no. 2011-1862 du 13 déc. 
2011 relative à la répartition du contentieux et à l’allègement de certaines procédures 
juridictionnelles. J.O. Sénat du 14/02/2013, p. 468. 
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system in Israel that travelled through East Jerusalem.190 Interestingly, the French 
appellate court dismissed the crimes against humanity claims against the French 
companies based on the Kiobel Second Circuit appellate court holding that 
corporations cannot be liable for customary international law violations,191 a 
holding that may have been invalidated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United to the extent one can apply the Supreme Court holding beyond the First 
Amendment,192 and that the Supreme Court chose not to affirm in its Kiobel 
review.193 
In 2012, France’s Supreme Court for private and criminal law (Cour de 
cassation) held a multinational company whose parent, Total SA, was incorporated 
in France, liable civilly (as well as criminally) for devastating environmental 
damage to the coast of Brittany due to oil spills caused by a Maltese tanker outside 
French waters.194 The case involved the liability, among many others, of Total 
International Ltd., the ship’s charterer, which was a Panamanian subsidiary of 
Total SA.195 The French court determined that it had jurisdiction in part because 
of the grave harm to the environment that had resulted from the accident.196 As 
far as the civil claims went, the French Supreme Court characterized the torts as 
“fautes de témérité,” or torts of “recklessness.”197 
In 2015, the Paris Court of Appeals created legal history in France when it 
awarded relief to 857 Congolese plaintiffs against the Gabon mining company 
COMILOG (Mining Company of the Ogooué) for wrongful discharge of workers 
and failure to pay pensions in Gabon when the basis for the French court’s 
jurisdiction over the defendant was the French nationality of COMILOG’s parent 
group, ERAMET.198 The case had originated when a train transporting 
                                                 
190  No. 11/05331, OLP c/ Société Alstom et Veolia, CA Versailles, 3e Ch. 22 mars 2013. For a more 
extensive report on extraterritorial jurisdiction in France, see Hervé Ascensio, Étude: 
l’extraterritorialité comme instrument, https://perma.cc/7435-7NH8. 
191  Id. 
192  Citizens United, supra note 184 (holding that for purposes of first amendment speech rights, there 
is no distinction between an individual and a corporation). In Kiobel itself, the Supreme Court 
declined to reach the issue of whether corporations can be liable for customary international law 
violations, although it originally had granted certiorari to do so. See 133 S. Ct., at 1663. 
193  It should also be noted that in France and other civil legal systems, where a judge is deemed to have 
made a mistake in legal reasoning, it need not be followed in subsequent cases, as there is no 
doctrine of stare decisis. 
194  See Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] crim., Sept. 25, 2012, No. 10–
82.938 (known in France as l’affaire Erika). 
195  Id. 
196  Id. 
197  Id. 
198  Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] soc., Sept. 25, 2012, No. 10–82.938. 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 436 Vol. 17 No. 2 
COMILOG’s manganese had collided with a passenger train, causing the death of 
more than a hundred people. After this incident, COMILOG stopped shipping 
raw materials by train, and subsequently laid off close to a thousand workers 
without paying promised severance pay or pensions. The French Supreme Court 
reversed lower court denials of jurisdiction on the reasoning that the plaintiffs had 
been denied justice in their home country.199 In French legal theory, such a 
conclusion can be based on either: (1) forum necessitatis, pursuant to which the 
lack of any alternative jurisdiction open to foreign victims for harm that befell 
them abroad suffices to give them access to French courts; or (2) the universal 
jurisdiction that is accorded grave violations of human rights.200 
There also have been some important judicial developments in several other 
countries over the last few years towards civil responsibility of parent companies 
for foreign subsidiary human rights violations. 
b) The U.K. 
In 2012, in Chandler v. Cape plc,201 the English Court of Appeal held a parent 
company directly liable to an employee of its subsidiary where the employee 
appeared to have been in contact solely with the subsidiary. This case did not 
involve a foreign subsidiary, however, as both were U.K. companies. In Chandler, 
the plaintiff was able to recover from his employer’s holding company for 
suffering the consequences of asbestosis where the court found that the parent 
company had had superior knowledge of the health risks and the ability to foresee 
that the subsidiary would rely on the parent company in avoiding those risks. The 
Chandler court also found that the subsidiary was controlled by its parent company. 
As Palombo suggests, by creating direct liability from parent company to victim, 
Chandler offers a potential alternative to piercing the corporate veil or to suing 
under customary international law standards.202  
Although Chandler did not involve a multinational corporation, the U.K.’s 
High Court of Justice recognized its applicability to the transnational context in 
                                                 
199  Id.; Queinnec, supra note 188, at 5. 
200  Étienne Pataut, Déni de justice et compétence internationale dans les litiges internationaux du travail, 2016 
DALLOZ 1175 (2016). French legal opinions have less extensive legal reasoning than U.S. 
counterparts and it is largely left to legal scholars to supply, modify or suggest legal theory to support 
case solutions, both retroactively and prospectively. On forum necessitatis, see infra, note 229 and 
surrounding text. For more commentary on the issue of French jurisdiction over parent companies 
for the acts of foreign subsidiaries occurring abroad, see Olivera Boskovic, Brèves remarques sur le 
devoir de vigilance et le droit iunternational privé, 2016 DALLOZ 385 (2016). 
201  Chandler v Cape plc [2012] EWCA (Civ.) 525. 
202  Dalia Palombo, Chandler v. Cape: An Alternative to Piercing the Corporate Veil Beyond Kiobel v. Royal 
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Lungowe v. Vedanta in 2016, four years after Chandler was decided.203 In Vedanta, the 
court held that it had jurisdiction over a parent company whose foreign subsidiary 
was accused of grave environmental harm in a mass tort that had been committed 
in Zambia against roughly 2,000 Zambian claimants, most of whom were 
subsistence farmers.204 Like Chandler, Vedanta was a case of direct parent liability. 
Notably, in Vedanta, the parent company defendant was not the sole owner of the 
subsidiary.205 The Vedanta court went further than the Court of Appeal in Chandler, 
not just in extending liability to the parents of foreign subsidiaries, but also in 
terms of its reasoning. The court’s analysis meshed with several of the theoretical 
frameworks that have been advanced in recent years in favor of holding parent 
companies liable for foreign subsidiary human rights violations. The court 
emphasized that the parent company had superior assets in contrast to its 
subsidiary’s precarious financial situation, such that the subsidiary might well be 
unable to satisfy a verdict if the mass tort action proved successful, and that the 
parent company had greatly profited from its subsidiary’s activities: “Vedanta 
might [even] put KCM [(its subsidiary)] into liquidation in order to avoid paying 
out to the claimants” 206 were the suit to be brought in Zambia, where the harm 
occurred, and “since it is Vedanta who are making millions of pounds out of the 
mine, it is Vedanta who should be called to account.”207 
This harkens to Skinner’s proposal that parent company liability be tied to 
the profits that a parent gains from its (potentially underfinanced) foreign 
subsidiary,208 as well as to Oh’s proposal that common law states should apply the 
doctrine of the constructive trust to impose liability on a parent company for its 
subsidiary’s conduct, where omitting to do so would entail unjust enrichment of 
the parent company.209 The Vedanta court also analyzed the liability of the formally 
separate entities as a single business enterprise, reminiscent of Blumberg’s theory 
for an expanded piercing of the corporate veil,210 and noted in the case at issue the 
problem that generally pervades foreign subsidiary human rights situations: 
                                                 
203  Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources Plc [2016] EWHC (TCC) 975. 
204  The number of claimants was under review at the time of the judgment, allowing for the possibility 
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205  See id. at ¶ 13. 
206  Id. at ¶ 79. 
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208  See Skinner, supra note 35, at 1780. 
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namely, the impossibility of plaintiffs’ obtaining adequate judicial remedies in the 
host country. 
Among the arguments the court rejected was the defendant’s claim that the 
plaintiff had sued the parent company only to be able to sue the subsidiary, the 
true target of the litigation, in the U.K.211 On the one hand, the court held that 
practical motives, such as the deeper pockets of the parent company, were 
justifiable considerations for suing the parent for the acts of the subsidiary. On 
the other hand, and relatedly, it held that suing the parent company was not a 
fraud or even a mere device for haling the subsidiary company into a British court, 
to the extent it was not the sole motive for suing.212 
Vedanta was decided less than a month before the U.K.’s June 23, 2016 vote 
to leave the E.U. The Vedanta court’s rejection of the defendant’s argument for 
forum non conveniens was based on the European Court of Justice’s (CJEU) decision 
in Owusu v. Jackson, which had held the doctrine of forum non conveniens incompatible 
with the Brussels Convention.213 The CJEU also held that an English court which 
had jurisdiction over a defendant domiciled in England could not refuse 
jurisdiction on the basis that the court of a non-E.U. Member State was a more 
suitable forum.214 While forum non conveniens may well return to British judicial 
reasoning in the future, the Vedanta decision also relied on the other avenues of 
analysis noted above, and should remain an important source of legal analysis for 
parent company liability in foreign subsidiary human rights violations cases. 
c) The Netherlands. 
Already in 2013, several years before Vedanta was decided, Akpan v. Shell,215 
a landmark Dutch case, had relied on both Chandler and Caparo v. Dickman, a 
British precedent on which the Chandler court had relied.216 In Akpan, the Dutch 
court held it had jurisdiction for acts that had occurred in Nigeria and harm that 
occurred in Nigeria, by a foreign subsidiary of Shell. Shell is a Dutch 
corporation.217 The case marks the first finding of liability by the judiciary of a 
                                                 
211  Id. at ¶¶ 75, 77, 78. 
212  Id. at ¶¶ 76–78. 
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215  District Court The Hague, 30 Jan. 2013, ECLI: NL: RBSGR: 2013: BY9854 (Akpan/Shell); aff’d on 
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developed country in the west for a multinational’s injury to the environment in a 
developing country.218 
In 2015, the Court of Appeals found that the lower District Court had 
jurisdiction over both the Dutch parent and its foreign subsidiary under the Dutch 
Code of Civil Procedure, which allows for a joinder of parties where the claims 
are sufficiently related.219 This rule is in keeping with Brussels I, Art. 6 (1).220 
Most notably, the Court of Appeals stated the following: 
Considering the foreseeable serious consequences of oil spillages, inter alia 
for the environment around the potential leakage, it cannot be excluded 
beforehand that in such a case the parent company may have to assume 
liability to prevent spillages (in other words, that a duty exists according to 
the requirements in the decision Caparo v. Dickman [1990] UKHL 2, [1990] 1 
All ER 56), the more so if the parent company has made a focal point of 
preventing environmental damage by activities of its subsidiaries and is to a 
certain extent actively involved in directing their operational management. 
This does not mean that without this attention and involvement a duty of 
care would not be conceivable and that a blameworthy negation of these 
interests could never lead to liability.221 
Thus, the Court of Appeals both stopped short of declaring, yet suggested 
the possibility of, a direct duty by the parent company when the violation is 
sufficiently serious. It also characterized Chandler as being non-exhaustive in its 
own analysis, and standing for the proposition that “it was not excluded that also 
other circumstances than the ones at stake in that case could lead to a duty of care 
of the parent company.”222 
In another blow to the parent company, the Dutch Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court’s refusal to order document disclosure by Shell to the 
plaintiffs, who were unable without company records to establish poor company 
maintenance of pipelines. In civil law countries, discovery requests generally must 
be made to a judge with a specificity unknown in U.S. common law discovery.223 
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Moreover, Article 7 of Rome II224 could indicate that Dutch law should 
apply,225 with the potential liability of the parent company. Article 7 applies to 
non-contractual duties deriving from environmental harm and allows the plaintiff 
to opt to sue “under the law of the country in which the event giving rise to the 
damage occurred.”226 
In addition to Rome II, Brussels I Recast227 has the theoretical tools to 
harmonize E.U. states inasmuch as it requires judges in Member States to take all 
relevant circumstances into account when deciding jurisdictional issues.228 
Moreover, Brussels I Recast, although it does not have a provision expressly 
adopting it, does not exclude the principle of forum necessitatis, according to which 
there must be some forum made available to the victim, and, if no forum is 
available, then normal jurisdictional rules generally can be suspended in order to 
create one.229 Numerous individual E.U. Member States, as well as Switzerland 
and Canada, do recognize the doctrine. This principle touches what is virtually 
always a core problem of these extraterritorial jurisdiction cases, because alleged 
victims of human rights abuses at the hands of foreign subsidiaries of large 
multinationals are only very rarely able to have a realistic forum in the state in 
which the violation occurred.230 
d) Canada. 
(1) HudBay. 
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Canadian law has had an innovative decision in the context of a number of 
cases filed against HudBay, an enormous Canadian multinational corporation.231 
The defendants were mining corporations operating in Guatemala whose parent 
company, HudBay, is Canadian.232 The defendants are two out of a thousand 
subsidiaries that the parent company has in one hundred different countries.233 
The case’s underlying complaint arose out of several land evictions of the native 
population in Guatemala. Evictions were effected by national police in order to 
facilitate the work of the subsidiaries. Security employees of the subsidiaries 
assisted the police, and some allegedly committed violent acts, including gang rape 
and murder.234 Some of the alleged rapes were linked to miscarriages in women 
who were pregnant before they were raped.235 
The Ontario Superior Court decided first, unsurprisingly, that the corporate 
veil separating subsidiaries from their parent company could be pierced if the 
plaintiffs are able to prove at trial that the subsidiaries had been operating as the 
parent company’s agents, agency constituting a traditional exception to the 
doctrine of the corporate veil.236 More noteworthy, however, was the court’s 
decision to deny dismissal for the charge of direct negligence against the Canadian 
parent company for the acts of its subsidiaries in Guatemala, which the court 
described as a “novel duty of care”237 resting on a tripartite test of (1) foreseeability 
of the harm; (2) “sufficient proximity” between defendant and plaintiffs such as 
to fairly impose a direct duty of care on the defendant; and (3) no countervailing 
policy sufficient to negate the imposition of such direct a duty of care on the 
defendants.238 
HudBay marks the first time that a Canadian court in a human rights case 
has accepted the possibility of civil liability for human rights violations of a parent 
company for the acts of its subsidiaries in a foreign country.239 It has also been 
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pointed out that in both this case and Chandler, the courts emphasized the specific 
factual circumstances. This would suggest that the parent companies have 
assumed a duty for the subsidiaries’ conduct, either through their control of the 
subsidiaries, or through their superior knowledge of the matters relevant to the 
legal issues and that, consequently, neither case stands for the proposition that a 
parent company has a general duty of care towards victims of its foreign 
subsidiaries.240 
It may, however, be that these cases do represent a significant first step 
towards the development of such a duty of care for parent companies because of 
the mechanisms by which common law legal orders undergo evolution. This is 
addressed in the following Section. 
(2) Common law methodology and an expanded duty of care. 
The common law historically has progressed by small first steps that do not 
appear to change the established, general principle. Rather, the first step is to 
create a small exception to the general rule, the second to enlarge and define the 
exception, and the third to have the exception become the new general rule, such 
that the original exception swallows and displaces the original rule.241 This is 
effected by the common law method of reasoning by analogy from the case at bar 
to precedents, which, as Levi explains, “operate[s] to change the idea after it has 
been adopted,”242 in a variety of ways. For one, where significant numbers of the 
population experience a pressing need for a new legal principle to take hold, 
lawyers will argue repeatedly for its application in specific cases, just as they do for 
the application of the view of a dissenting justice that lost in a past case, until 
finally, what starts either as a limited exception or, in the event of a dissenter’s 
opinion, as the losing side, may become articulated as a winning legal principle in 
a future case, later to become established as a respected rule.243 We already are 
witnessing such a common-law-like evolution as European Member State courts 
interpret codes and statutes in consultation with, and by analogy to, each other’s 
decisions.244 
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In his book that underscores the importance of considering foreign law, 
Justice Breyer “predict[s] . . . that as economic globalization marches on, . . . we 
must remember that legal certainty is particularly important to commercial actors. 
So is uniformity of result across borders.”245 When they consider arguments 
rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, in expanding agency theory 
with respect to foreign subsidiaries, and in creating a direct duty of care theory, 
U.S. judges may also be more likely to take greater note of Canadian decisions 
such as HudBay and Vedanta than of Continental European cases that may be more 
difficult for them to access.246 But as the various courts of home states continue 
to increase mutual contacts and knowledge of each other’s decisions, two 
developments are predictable: mutual influence will be ensured in Continental 
European legal systems because of the entrenched role comparative law already 
enjoys there; and common law systems will inch towards adopting exceptions that 
eventually swallow their previous rules, as they have been doing for centuries. 
e) The E.U. 
We saw earlier that U.S. law has long been of the view in antitrust cases that 
a parent and its subsidiaries have the same interests and aims.247 In E.U. 
competition law, parent companies are presumed liable for the conduct of their 
wholly-, and almost wholly-, owned subsidiaries.248 This presumption of parent 
company liability has become extremely difficult for a parent company to rebut: 
in a June 16, 2016 decision, the CJEU held that even where a parent company had 
ordered its subsidiary not to enter into an anti-competitive agreement, the parent 
company was liable for its subsidiary’s disobedience on the reasoning that the 
order was “not sufficient to establish the absence of actual influence” by the 
parent.249 
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Similarly, where in a related case the parent company had argued that it was 
no more than an outside financial investor and that a third party had exercised 
decisive influence on the subsidiary’s acts, the CJEU held that the parent company 
had not rebutted the presumption of its own liability for its subsidiary’s illegal 
conduct, as it had not established that it had failed to exercise decisive influence 
over the subsidiary’s actions. 250 More specifically, the Court held that establishing 
the decisive influence of any third party over the subsidiary was irrelevant to the 
parent company’s own liability.251 
The CJEU has emphasized that European competition law analysis is 
premised on the theory that parent and subsidiary form a single economic unit, 
and on that basis are jointly and severally liable for each other’s misconduct: 
“[T]he concept of an undertaking . . . must be understood as designating an 
economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists of several persons, 
natural or legal.”252 
E. Executive Action 
In the few years since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kiobel, and shifted the 
terrain of reasoning about the ATS from an international human rights context to 
an extraterritorial jurisdictional context in a line of commercial law precedents,253 
the federal appellate and district courts have struggled to give meaning to the term 
the Supreme Court used in Kiobel to designate how the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might be rebutted. More specifically, the courts have struggled 
with what is meant by the requirement that tortious harms “touch and concern 
the United States with sufficient force.”254 There are inter-circuit conflicts 
already,255 such that sooner or later the Supreme Court will have to accept another 
ATS case so that it can help to give concrete guidance as to the meaning of the 
term. 
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As the ATS diminishes in importance for foreign plaintiffs seeking 
compensation for human rights damages, and is likely to remain of marginal utility 
at least for some time to come,256 there may be other ways of approaching the 
issue under U.S. law. In the past, Congress enabled the president to extend 
extraterritorial jurisdiction within the ambit of particular national emergencies, as 
is constitutionally required.257 In recent years, we have seen an unprecedented 
expansion of unilateral executive power in the U.S.258 This may pose a risk to the 
future of the political system,259 but the fact remains that the president’s power 
has greatly expanded. 
Recently, for instance, Treasury Department regulations addressed a specific 
merger planned by Pfizer and Allergan.260 Allergan is an Irish corporation, and the 
merger would have permitted Pfizer to gain Irish nationality for purposes of 
avoiding U.S. corporate tax rates.261 New regulations, adopted on the eve of the 
projected merger, abruptly ended the deal.262 Thus, finely-tuned executive actions 
might address civil liability of parent companies for breaches of fundamental 
human rights by foreign subsidiaries in limited circumstances. The problem with 
such after-the-fact executive actions, and especially with targeting particular 
companies, may be the risk of diminishing public confidence in government, 
which is a serious consideration.263 No such extreme particularity would be called 
for in the context of foreign subsidiary universal human rights violations, 
however. 
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F. International Criminal Liabili ty  
International criminal liability for the worst human rights abuses by 
multinational corporations should perhaps also be evoked. Corporations have a 
long history of being analyzed in terms of their constitutional rights, and in the 
U.S. their equivalence to natural persons has grown.264 In France, the corporation 
is also treated as a person, and this is a common, although not unanimous, trend 
among western developed states.265 As nations analogize the corporation ever 
more to a natural person, it may also be appropriate, as Justice Binnie of the 
Canadian Supreme Court has suggested, to consider extending the International 
Criminal Court’s jurisdiction to include corporations.266 
III.  CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, if we look at the phenomenon of transnationalization through 
the lens of the multinational corporation and of universal human rights, we should 
be reflecting on how best to address the future. Concerted or harmonious efforts 
across nations have much to be recommended where the problems are those 
defined by the end of national borders. Can some sort of new jus commune be 
fashioned with the common law, centuries after national codifications put an end 
to the last one? Could it coexist with a flourishing of national laws and 
sovereignties in their national legal cultures? 
Our world has become one of encounter, but encounter and presence do 
not imply mutual understanding. Problems internationalize with mobility and 
contact. The challenge remains to puzzle out the riddles of the various, diverse 
jurisdictions. In this way, those searching to harmonize results may better 
interpret, better communicate and better solve together, so that multinational 
corporations assume their role as good citizens in all of their component parts, 
and wherever they may be. 
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